Methods for privacy-preserving data publishing and analysis trade off privacy risks for individuals against the quality of output data. In this article, we present a data publishing algorithm that satisfies the differential privacy model. The transformations performed are truthful, which means that the algorithm does not perturb input data or generate synthetic output data. Instead, records are randomly drawn from the input dataset and the uniqueness of their features is reduced. This also offers an intuitive notion of privacy protection. Moreover, the approach is generic, as it can be parameterized with different objective functions to optimize its output towards different applications. We show this by integrating six well-known data quality models. We present an extensive analytical and experimental evaluation and a comparison with prior work. The results show that our algorithm is the first practical implementation of the described approach and that it can be used with reasonable privacy parameters resulting in high degrees of protection. Moreover, when parameterizing the generic method with an objective function quantifying the suitability of data for building statistical classifiers, we measured prediction accuracies that compare very well with results obtained using state-ofthe-art differentially private classification algorithms.
Fig. 1. Common components of data anonymization algorithms.
Based on such formal requirements, privacy protection can be implemented with anonymization algorithms which transform data to ensure that the requirements are met while reductions in data quality are quantified and minimized [2] . As is sketched in Figure 1 , anonymization algorithms can be modelled as a process in which a set of available data transformations is being searched, while an anonymization operator is used to make sure that privacy requirements are satisfied and quality is assessed to guide the search process. We emphasize that this is a very high-level overview and that the design of concrete algorithms often depends on the privacy models, quality models, and, most importantly, the types of data transformation implemented.
Differential privacy [10] takes a different approach to privacy protection, as it is not a property of a dataset, but a property of a data processing method. Informally, it guarantees that the probability of any possible output of a probabilistic algorithm (called mechanism) does not change "by much" if data of an individual is added to or removed from input data. Implementing differential privacy does not require making strong assumptions about the background knowledge of attackers, e.g. about which attributes could be used for re-identification. Moreover, differential privacy provides strong protection, while syntactic models are much less reliable [9] .
Differential privacy, however, has also been criticized for various reasons. First, implementations are often non-truthful, i.e. perturbative, as they rely on noise addition [5, 6] . Truthfulness can be a desirable property in many fields [3] . Examples include governmental or industrial applications [21] and the medical domain, in which implausible data created by perturbation (e.g. combinations or dosages of drugs which are harmful for a patient) have led to challenges for introducing noise-based mechanisms [6] . Second, the semantics of differential privacy are complex and it has been argued that the approach is much more difficult to explain to decision makers, e.g. to ethics committees and policy makers, than the idea of hiding in a crowd often implemented by syntactic models [6] . Finally, differentially private mechanisms are typically special-purpose algorithms developed for specific applications, see e.g. [17, 31, 32] . Many of them serve the interactive scenario, i.e. they provide perturbed answers to (limited sets of) queries. In contrast, microdata publishing methods aim to release a sanitized dataset that supports a variety of use cases. The development of such non-interactive methods which satisfy differential privacy while retaining sufficient data quality has remained challenging.
Contributions and Outline
Previous work has shown that algorithms which draw a random sample of data followed by k-anonymization can fulfill differential privacy [26, 39, 40] . These results are notable, as they combine statistical disclosure control, data anonymization and differential privacy.
In this article, we build upon this approach to implement a traditional data anonymization algorithm (see Figure 1 ) with differentially private components. The result is a practical method for non-interactive microdata publishing that fulfills differential privacy. The method is truthful, as randomization is implemented via sampling only and attribute values are transformed with truthful methods. Moreover, it is intuitive, as privacy is protected by sampling records and reducing the uniqueness of their features. Finally, the approach employs a flexible search strategy which can be parameterized with a wide variety of data quality models to optimize its output towards different applications. While developing the approach, we had to overcome multiple challenges.
On the theoretical level, we have completed and extended the proofs presented in [39] and [40] to develop a method for obtaining the exact privacy guarantees obtained by the approach instead of loose upper bounds. This enabled us to strengthen a theorem about the privacy guarantees provided, to study the relationships between random sampling, k-anonymization and differential privacy in more detail and to show that the approach can be used with reasonable parameterizations providing strong privacy protection. Moreover, we have transformed six common data quality models into a form suitable for integration into the approach.
On the practical level, we have performed an extensive experimental evaluation and a comparison with related work. We have evaluated general-purpose data quality and, as an application example, performed experiments with statistical classification. Our evaluation shows that the approach is practical in terms of runtime complexity and output quality. Moreover, when our generic method is parameterized with an according data quality model, it can be used to create classifiers which are en-par with, and sometimes significantly outperform, state-of-the-art approaches. This is notable, as these competitors are pertubative special-purpose implementations of the differential privacy model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We provide background information in Section 2. Then, we give a high-level overview of the method in Section 3. The anonymization operator is presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the objective functions. In Section 6 we introduce the search strategy. Section 7 presents analytical evaluations of the method. In Section 8 we present results of experimental analyses, including comparisons with related approaches. Section 9 reviews related work. Section 10 concludes and summarizes this article and Section 11 discusses future work.
Background and Preliminaries

Dataset
For an arbitrary dataset D with m attributes we will denote the domains of attribute 1 to m by Ω 1 , ..., Ω m . Then, we can regard D to be a multiset D ⊆ Ω 1 × ... × Ω m , and we will denote the universe of all datasets D ⊆ Ω 1 × ... × Ω m with D m . Analogously to other articles we will assume that each individual who contributed data to a dataset is represented by exactly one record r = (r 1 , ..., r m ) ∈ D and refer to such datasets as microdata.
Transformation Models
Data anonymization is typically performed by reducing the distinguishability of records. Common methods for doing so are clustering and aggregation of data items [28] , the introduction of noise and the generalization and suppression of attribute values [2] .
In this paper we focus on attribute generalization through user-specified hierarchies, which describe rules for replacing values with more general but semantically consistent values on increasing levels of generalization. Figure 2 shows two examples. Without loss of generality we will assume that a generalization hierarchy is provided for each attribute i = 1, ..., m so that the values on level 0 form the domain Ω i while we denote the set of values on levels greater than 0 by Λ i . For a given value r i ∈ Ω i ∪ Λ i we will call each value on level 0 which is an element of the subtree rooted at r i a leaf node of r i . For example, the leaf nodes of " [20, 80[" in Figure 2 are "20", ..., "79". We will indicate the removal of a record by replacing it with the placeholder * = ( * , ..., * ). Since generalizing a value to the highest level effectively suppresses the value we will also denote the root values of all hierarchies with * .
Solution Spaces and Search Strategies
Most anonymization algorithms can be described as search algorithms through all possible outputs defined by the data transformation model. While they are obviously not always implemented this way (e.g. clustering algorithms typically use heuristics to guide the clustering process [28] ) search algorithms are often implemented in combination with generalization hierarchies. The exact nature of the search space then depends on the generalization method.
For example, full-domain generalization generalizes all values of an attribute to the same level. With subtree generalization different values of an attribute can be generalized to different levels [2] . In this article we will focus on full-domain generalization, which results in search spaces that can be described with generaliza-tion lattices. An example is shown in Figure 3 . An arrow denotes that a transformation is a direct successor of a more specialized transformation, i.e. it can be derived from its predecessor by incrementing the generalization level of exactly one attribute. The number of transformations in a generalization lattice grows exponentially with the number of attributes [15] and a wide variety of globally-optimal and heuristic search algorithms for generalization lattices have been proposed [15, [33] [34] [35] In this article we will use the following notion. A generalization scheme is a function g :
mapping records to (possibly) generalized records. Obviously, every transformation which performs full-domain generalization can be formalized as a generalization scheme. Unless otherwise noted, we define the solution space G m to be the set of all full-domain generalization schemes which is determined by the generalization hierarchies of all attributes of a given dataset.
Anonymization Operators
An anonymization operator implements a privacy model. It determines whether or not a record or dataset satisfies the privacy requirements and may also modify the data. For example, in clustering algorithms, the anonymization operator may merge the records within a cluster into an equivalence class that satisfies k-anonymity, which we define as follows: [52] ). For a given dataset
, we define an equivalence class E ⊆ D to be the multiset of all records in D which share a given combination of attribute values. An equivalence class E satisfies k-anonymity if |E| ≥ k holds. D satisfies k-anonymity if each record r ∈ D cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 other records, i.e. if all equivalence classes E ⊆ D are k-anonymous.
As a part of algorithms implementing full-domain generalization, the anonymization operator typically sup-presses records which do not satisfy the privacy requirements [52] . This principle can not only be implemented for k-anonymity but also for further privacy models, including l-diversity [1] , t-closeness [28] and δ-presence [47] , which have been proposed for protecting data from threats that go beyond re-identification.
Quality Assessment
Measuring reductions in data quality due to anonymization is non-trivial as usefulness depends on the use case.
When it is unknown in advance how the data will be used, general-purpose quality models can be employed. They typically estimate data quality by quantifying the amount of information loss, e.g. by measuring similarities between the input and the output dataset [2] . Models can roughly be classified as measuring information loss on the attribute-level, cell-level or record-level. Typical examples for changes on these levels are differences in the distributions of attribute values (attribute-level), reductions in the granularity of data (cell-level) and differences in the sizes of equivalence classes (record-level).
Special-purpose (or workload-aware) quality models quantify data quality for a specific application scenario, e.g. statistical classification. Thereby the task is to predict the value of a predefined class attribute from a given set of values of feature attributes. This is implemented with supervised learning where a model is created from a training set [54] . Specific quality models have been developed for optimizing data for this purpose [25, 37] .
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy requires that any output of a mechanism is almost as likely, independent of whether or not a record is present in the input dataset [10] . ( , δ)-Differential privacy can be formally defined with respect to two datasets D 1 and D 2 satisfying |D 1 ⊕D 2 | = 1, which means that D 2 can be obtained from D 1 by either adding or removing one record: Definition 2 (( , δ)-differential privacy [6] ). A randomized function K provides ( , δ)-differential privacy if for all datasets D 1 , D 2 ∈ D m with |D 1 ⊕ D 2 | = 1, and all measurable S ⊆ Range(K),
holds with a probability of at least 1 − δ.
( , 0)-Differential privacy is usually just called -differential privacy. For δ > 0, ( , δ)-differential privacy is then a relaxation of -differential privacy.
Sequences of differentially private computations are also differentially private: Theorem 1. For i = 1, ..., n, let the mechanism M i provide i -differential privacy. Then the sequence M r1 1 (D), ..., M rn n (D), where M ri i denotes mechnism M i supplied with the outcomes of M 1 , ..., M i−1 , satisfies n i=1 i -differential privacy [45] .
A common method to achieve differentially privacy is the exponential mechanism [44] . It ranks all potential outputs r ∈ R for a given input dataset D using a realvalued score function s. It then randomly chooses one according to a specific probability distribution which assigns higher probabilities to outputs with higher scores: Definition 3 (Exponential mechanism [44] ). For any function s : (D m × R) → R, the exponential mechanism E s (D, R) chooses and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp s(D,r) 2∆s , where the sensitivity ∆s of the function s is defined as
It can be seen that it is important to use score functions which assign higher scores to outputs with higher quality while having a low sensitivity. The privacy guarantees provided are as follows:
Theorem 2. For any function s : (D m × R) → R, E s (D, R) satisfies -differential privacy [44] .
Overview of the Approach
Prior work has shown that randomization via sampling can be used to achieve ( , δ)-differentially privacy [26, 39, 40] . We build upon and extend these results to implement the SafePub algorithm. It comprises a search strategy, an anonymization operator and various methods for quality assessment, similar to many anonymization algorithms. The overall privacy budget is split up into two parts anon , which is used by the anonymization operator, and search , which is used by the search strategy. SafePub satisfies ( anon + search , δ)-differential privacy, where δ and the number of iterations performed by the search strategy (steps) can also be specified. Figure 4 shows the high-level design of the approach. It also indicates the parameters which are relevant for the individual steps. First, SafePub performs pre-processing by random sampling, selecting each for (g ∈ G) do 6: Anonymize D s using g ( anon , δ)
7:
Assess quality of resulting data 8: end for 9: Probabilistically select solution g ∈ G ( search ) 10: end for 11: return Dataset D s anonymized using ( anon , δ) the best solution selected in Line 9 record independently with probability β = 1 − e − anon . This leads to provable privacy guarantees as we will see in the next section. Then, a search through the space of all full-domain generalization schemes is performed. It comprises multiple iterations which are implemented by the for-loop in lines 3 to 10. In each iteration the sample is anonymized using every full-domain generalization scheme in the set G. The quality of the resulting data is assessed and a good solution is selected in a probabilistic manner. Finally, the mechanism returns the best transformation which has been selected during all iterations. In the following sections we will describe each component in greater detail.
Anonymization Operator
An overview of the anonymization operator is shown in Figure 5 . It builds upon prior work by Li et al. [39] which we have extended with a parameter calculation so that the operator satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy for arbitrary user-specified parameters. The operator first generalizes the (sampled) input dataset using the generalization scheme g, and then suppresses every record which appears less than k times. Thereby the integer k is derived from the privacy parameters δ and anon . We will simply denote anon with in this section.
Every output of the operator obviously satisfies 
where n m := k γ − 1 , γ := e −1+β e and f (j; n, β) := n j β j (1 − β) n−j , which is the probability mass function of the binomial distribution [39] .
It can be seen that the calculation of β described in Section 3 follows from Theorem 3:
We will explain why we set β = β max in Section 8.2.
To derive a practical anonymization operator from Theorem 3, it is necessary to calculate a value for k from given values of , δ and β. This is not trivial since Equation ( 2) requires to find the maximum of an infinite non-monotonic sequence. In the following we will show how this is implemented in SafePub. To do so, we will first introduce some definitions for notational convenience and recapitulate some important prior results.
For ease of notation we define the sequence: a n := n j>γn f (j; n, β).
It follows that d(k, β, ) = max n:n≥nm a n . Furthermore, we will use the following sequence:
Li et al. have shown in [40] that c n is strictly monotonically decreasing with lim n→∞ c n = 0 and that it is an upper bound for a n , i.e. it satisfies:
∀n ∈ N : a n ≤ c n .
From these results we can conclude:
max n:n≥nm
The sequence a n consists of sums which are, except for multiplicative factors, partial sums of a row in Pascal's triangle. For such sums no closed-form expressions are known [23] . However, we will show that the function d can still be evaluated by using the following simplified representation: Proof. From lim n→∞ c n = 0 and a nm > 0 we can conclude:
Henceñ exists. Since the sequence c n is monotonically decreasing with increasing n it follows that:
∀n >ñ : a n ≤ (5) c n ≤ cñ ≤ a nm ≤ max {a nm , ..., añ} .
We can conclude: max {a nm , ..., añ} = max n:n≥nm a n = d(k, β, ) .
Theorem 4 allows to derive δ from k, β and by calculating both a n and c n for increasing values of n ≥ n m until an indexñ satisfying cñ ≤ a nm is reached. δ is then the maximum of the finite sequence a nm , ..., añ. This strategy is schematically illustrated in Figure 6 . For fixed values of β and we obtain the function d(·, β, ) : N → [0, 1]. In order to use this function to compute a value of k so that ( , δ)-differential privacy is provably satisfied, we will first prove that d(·, β, ) converges: Proof. Note that n m is a function of k which satisfies:
Using the strict monotonicity of c n we can conclude:
The claim follows according to the squeeze theorem.
From this result we can conclude:
In order to find the smallest such k for a given value of δ, we can evaluate d(k, β, ) as described above for increasing values of k ∈ N until d(k, β, ) ≤ δ is satisfied. More formally, k can be computed using the function:
We denote the output of the operator with S(D) := suppress(g(D), k), where g(D) := r∈D {g(r)} and suppress denotes a function that suppresses every record which appears less than k times.
Quality Assessment
The output of the anonymization operator must be assessed to determine a good solution. For this purpose the search strategy employs the exponential mechanism. In this section we will present implementations of common quality models as score functions and discuss their sensitivities. They comprise five general-purpose models which are frequently used in the literature [28, 56] and which have been recommended in current data de-identification guidelines [11] as well as a special-purpose model for building statistical classifiers. For proofs we refer to Appendix B.
Granularity and Intensity
Data Granularity is a cell-level, general-purpose model. It measures the extent to which the values in a dataset cover the domains of the respective attributes [25] . Since the model already has a low sensitivity, we can multiply its results with −1 to obtain a score function which measures data quality rather than information loss: Definition 4. For i = 1, ..., m, let leaves i : Ω i ∪ Λ i → N denote the function which returns the number of leaf nodes for each value r i within the generalization hierarchy of the i-th attribute. For every k ∈ N, we define the score function gran k : (D m × G m ) → R as follows:
The sensitivity of gran k is as follows (see Appendix B.1):
Theorem 6. For every k ∈ N, the following holds:
Generalization Intensity is another cell-level, general-purpose model which sums up the relative generalization level of values in all cells [52] . A score function intensity k : (D m × G m ) → R which is tailored to this model, and which has the same sensitivity as gran k , can be constructed analogously.
Discernibility
Discernibility is a record-level, general-purpose model which penalizes records depending on the size of the equivalence class they belong to [3] . Let EQ(D) denote the set of all equivalence classes of D, except of { * ∈ D}, which contains the suppressed records in D. We first define the following normalized variant of the model:
We note that suppressed records are considered separately from the other records in Equation (7) as this improves the sensitivity of the function. The score function disc k : (D m × G m ) → R is defined as follows:
The sensitivity of disc k is as follows (see Appendix B.2): Theorem 7. For every k ∈ N, the following holds:
Non-Uniform Entropy
Non-Uniform Entropy is an attribute-level, general-purpose model which quantifies the amount of information that can be obtained about the input dataset by observing the output dataset [7] . According to this model information loss increases with increasing homogeneity of attribute values in the output dataset. Hence we will base the score function on a measure of homogeneity. Let p i (D) denote the projection of D to its i-th attribute. We can then measure the homogeneity of attribute values in D using the function φ (see Equation (7)) by calculating m i=1 φ(p i (D)) and thus define:
The sensitivity of ent k is as follows (see Appendix B.3):
Group Size
Group Size is a record-level, general-purpose model which measures the average size of equivalence classes [36] . We derive a score function which is inversely correlated to this model as follows:
Definition 7. For every k ∈ N, the score function groups k : (D m × G m ) → R is defined as:
Since the addition of a single record can lead to at most one additional equivalence class, it is easy to see that ∀k ∈ N : ∆groups k ≤ 1 holds.
Statistical Classification
Iyengar has proposed a special-purpose model which measures the suitability of data as a training set for statistical classifiers [25] . It penalizes records which do not contain the most frequent combination of feature and class attribute values. Since the model already has a low sensitivity, we can derive a practical score function by giving weights to records which are not penalized:
Let fv(r ) denote the the sub-vector of a record r which consists of the feature attribute values in r . The record r is given a weight by the function w if fv(r ) is not suppressed and if the class attribute value cv(r ) of r is equal to the most frequent class value cv maj (S(D), r ) among all records in S(D) which share the same combination of feature values. More precisely, we define:
The sensitivity of class k is as follows (see Appendix B.4):
Theorem 9. For every k ∈ N, ∆class k ≤ k holds.
Search Strategy
The search strategy implements a (randomized) top-down search through the generalization lattice using the scores which are calculated according to the given quality model. Traversal is implemented by iterative applications of the exponential mechanism which exponentially favors transformations with high scores, and thus likely returns transformations resulting in good output data quality (see Section 2.6). For ease of notation we will denote search with in this section. pivot ← E˜ s (D, candidates) 10: if (s(D, pivot) > s(D, optimum)) then 11: optimum ← pivot 12: end if 13: end for 14: return optimum The scores of all direct predecessors of are calculated and the transformations are put into the set candidates. In each iteration a pivot element is selected from the set using the exponential mechanism with a privacy budget of˜ = /steps, the scores of all its direct predecessors are calculated, and the predecessors are being added to candidates. The pivot element is then removed from the set. After a predefined number of steps the method returns the pivot element with the best score.
We note that using steps = 0 is possible but impractical, as this results in the deterministic selection of the transformation that suppresses all data. Figure 8 schematically illustrates the method. A black circle represents a pivot element and the gray triangle below it represents its direct predecessors. The method is likely to perform a best-first search, following a path of transformations with increasing score values (e.g. the path from transformation no. 1 to no. 4). We note that it is not likely that the algorithm will be trapped in a local minimum, i.e. that it continues following a path of elements with non-optimal score values. The reason is that the predecessors of all previously selected pivot elements are left in the set candidates. For example, if all predecessors of pivot element no. 4 have a lower score than transformation no. 5, then transformation no. 5 will likely be selected as the next pivot element. Moreover, following a non-optimal path is unlikely to negatively affect the quality of the overall output, as the final solution is selected deterministically. The privacy guarantees provided are as follows:
Theorem 10. For every parameter steps ∈ N 0 and > 0, the search strategy satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. If steps = 0 holds the search strategy returns in a deterministic manner and hence trivially satisfies -differential privacy. In the following we will assume that steps > 0 holds. We note that the only instructions which modify the content of the variables pivot and candidates are located in lines seven to nine.
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For every iteration i ∈ {1, ..., steps} of the enclosing loop, let M ri i (D) denote the sequence of operations performed by these three lines during the i-th iteration. Let r i = (pivot i , candidates i ) denote the content of the variables pivot and candidates before the i-th iteration of the loop. Then each r i is determined by
and supplied to M ri i (D) which outputs r i+1 in a manner that satisfies˜ -differential privacy according to Theorem 2. We can conclude from Theorem 1 that the sequence M r1 1 (D), ..., M rsteps steps (D) satisfies -differential privacy since steps i=1˜ = holds. Finally, the algorithm returns the generalization scheme with the highest score value amongst all pivot elements selected by the differentially private operations M r1 1 (D), ..., M rsteps steps (D) in a deterministic manner. Hence the algorithm satisfies -differential privacy.
Analytical Evaluation
Complexity Analysis
Let n = |D| denote the number of records, each consisting of m attributes. Each basic operation, i.e. drawing a random sample, executing the anonymization operator and evaluating a score function, has a runtime complexity of O(n · m). In each step of the search process, the anonymization operator and the score function are being evaluated once for at most m predecessors of the current pivot element. Hence each step has a time complexity of O(n · m 2 ). The number of steps performed is a user-defined parameter and we will derive recommendations experimentally in Section 8.
We note that the method for calculating the parameters of the algorithm described in Section 4 is of non-trivial runtime complexity. Unfortunately a detailed analysis is complex and out of the scope of this work. We have, however, performed experimental evaluations using a wide variety of common parameterizations which showed that the approach is practical. We will present the results in the next section.
Parameter Analysis
In this section we analyze dependencies between parameters of SafePub. We will focus on anon and δ since they determine k and β in a non-trivial manner. For ease of of notation, we will denote anon with . Figure 9 shows the values of β and k obtained for various values of and δ as described in Section 4. We focus on common values of [6] . Later we will set δ to 10 −m with m ∈ N such that δ < 1/n, where n is the size of the dataset, and at least δ ≤ 10 −4 holds. This is a recommended parameterization [38, 40] . We focus on ranges of δ relevant to our evaluation datasets (see Section 8.1).
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DEPENDENCIES BETWEEN PARAMETERS
In the following, we present an analysis of dependencies between parameters of SafePub. For that, we have investigated the correlation between the sampling probability β max and the uniqueness threshold k which SafePub derives from realistic privacy parameters and δ. Thereby, smaller values for and δ guarantee higher levels of privacy protection, while smaller values of β max and higher values of k result in a potential decrease of data quality. Figure 6 shows the values of β max and k we obtained for various values of and δ. We focused on common values of listed in [8] . It has been recommended to define δ to be strictly smaller than 1/n, where n is the size of the dataset [20] . Since SafePub satisfies the smoothness property and hence provides stronger privacy guarantees than ( , δ)-differential privacy, we defined δ as 10 −m with m ∈ N such that δ is strictly smaller than 1/n. We focused on ranges relevant to our evaluation datasets (see Section 6.1).
As can be seen, for fixed values of , smaller values of δ resulted in higher values of k and thus potentially reduced data quality. Decreasing , however, had two consequences with possibly opposing impacts on data quality: On one hand, β max decreased, but on the other hand, for fixed values of δ, k decreased as well, which might actually result in improved data quality. Thereby, β max decreased rapidly for smaller values of , which means that the approach is not feasible for small values of . When increased, the increase of β max flattened, while k increased substantially. Figure 7 illustrates the smoothness property for = 1 and various values of δ. As can be seen, the probability of exceeding the privacy parameter decreased exponentially for linearly increasing degrees of exceedance. The smaller δ was, the st smoothness e based on the the smoothne Moreover lower than ea can be expla increases k u δ is reached. k, it is to be δ holds. This slightly stron When cal nation of an Intel Core i5 41 ms and 2 the algorithm realistic priva 6 ANALYS As can be seen, for fixed values of , decreasing δ increases k and thus potentially reduces data quality. Decreasing , however, has two consequences with possibly opposing impacts: On one hand, β decreases, but on the other hand, for fixed values of δ, k decreases as well. The value of β decreases rapidly for smaller values of which indicates that our approach is not practical with such parameterizations. When increases, the increase of β flattens, while k increases further.
We also measured the time required to calculate β max and k for every discussed here and 10 −4 ≤ δ ≤ 10 −20 on a desktop PC with a quad-core 3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU. We measured between 0.1s and 37s with an average of 4.5s. This shows that the method presented in Section 4 terminates quickly for realistic privacy parameters.
Smooth Privacy
While the ( , δ)-differential privacy model guarantees that the bound exp( ) in Inequation (1) may be exceeded with a probability of at most δ, it does not restrict the permitted degree of exceedance.
Li et al. have suggested that the mechanism studied here has the property that the higher such an exceedance is, the more unlikely it is to occur [40] . However, their results just provide upper bounds for these probabilities based on Inequation (6) which are very conservative: For example, for the values = 1, β = 0.632 and k = 75, they overestimate δ by more than four orders of magnitude (3.7 · 10 −2 vs. 10 −6 ). Based on our results, we can calculate the exact probabilities:
Theorem 11 (Smoothness property). For arbitrary parameters = anon > 0 and δ > 0, let β and k be the parameters derived as described in Section 4. Then the combination of random sampling with probability β and the anonymization operator satisfies ( , d(k, β, ) )-differential privacy simultaneously for every ≥ while d(k, β, ) is monotonically decreasing when increases.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Figure 10 illustrates the smoothness property for = 1 and various values of δ. As can be seen, the probability of exceeding decreases exponentially for increasing degrees of exceedance. The smaller δ, the steeper are the curves, which means that the smoothness effect is stronger. Hence, when δ is set based on the size of the dataset as described in Section 7.2, the degree of protection increases with increasing size of the dataset. 
Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented our method using the open source ARX Data Anonymization Tool 1 . In this section we present experimental analyses of each individual component of SafePub and develop recommendations for parameterizations. Furthermore, we present results of comparisons with related methods.
Datasets and Setup
We used four different datasets (see [48] ) in our experiments: The datasets have increasing volumes, ranging from about 30, 000 to more than a million records. All include sensitive data such as demographics (e.g. sex, age) or health-related data. Table 1 provides an overview of the datasets and parameterizations we used in our experiments. It also shows results of the smoothness property, i.e. the probability δ of violating 2-differential privacy.
Analysis of the Anonymization Operator
First we examine the amount of records preserved (i.e. not removed by random sampling or record suppression) by the anonymization operator, which is a generic utility estimate. We set search = 0 and used three full-domain generalization schemes defining low, medium or high relative generalization levels for the attributes in the datasets. We note that the parameter determines the degree of privacy provided together with δ while the relative generalization level balances the loss of information resulting from generalization against the loss of information resulting from record suppression -the higher the degree of generalization is, the more records are likely to become indistinguishable, and hence the fewer records have to be removed for violating k-anonymity.
We focus on the parameters also investigated in Section 7.2. Figure 11 shows averages of 10 executions. All standard deviations were less than 1%.
21 s with an average of 1.6 s. This shows that the parameter calculation presented in Section IV terminates quickly when realistic privacy parameters are being used.
VI. ANALYSIS OF DATA QUALITY
A. Setup
We performed experiments with four datasets [11] : 1) Census, an excerpt of records from the 1994 US census database which is commonly used in evaluations of anonymization algorithms, 2) FARS, which contains records about fatal traffic accidents from the NHTSA Fatality Analysis Reporting System, 3) ATUS, consisting of responses to the American Time Use Survey, and 4) IHIS, a set of records from the Integrated Health Interview Series. The datasets have increasing volumes, ranging from about 30, 000 to more than a million records. All include potentially identifying and sensitive data such as demographics (e.g. sex, age) and health data. Table I provides an overview of our datasets, including the values of δ obtained with the strategy described in Section V, which we used throughout our evaluations. It also shows results of the smoothness property, in this case the probability δ with which 2-differential privacy may be violated. For each dataset, we defined three data-independent generalization schemes with different degrees of generalization: Low, Medium, and High. Each scheme specifies a relative generalization level (regarding the height of the hierarchy) for
B. Preservation of Individual-Level Data
In this section, we examine the amount of individual-level data which is being preserved for various realistic privacy parameters. We measured the number of preserved records for each dataset, generalization scheme, and value of investigated in Section V using the values of δ from Table I. Figure 6 shows the arithmetic means of 10 runs of SafePub using the highest possible sampling probability β max for each configuration. All standard deviations were smaller than 1%. As can be seen, lower values of tendentially led to fewer records being preserved. Only for small datasets, low degrees of generalization, and high values of , the decrease of k did outweigh the decrease of β max so that more records were preserved (see "US Census" and "Crash statistics" datasets when decreases from 2 to 1.5). In all other cases, the lower sampling probability dominated, especially for ≤ 1.5. For this reason, we decided to always use the highest possible sampling probability β max in order to retain as much records as possible for realistic privacy parameters. In the following sections, we will use = 1, which is a common parameterization [12] , [13] , and which provides a good balance between data privacy and data quality for our approach.
As can also be seen in Figure 6 , higher degrees of generalization allowed for the preservation of a larger number As can be seen, lower values of , and the resulting reduction of β and k (see Section 7.2), tendentially led to fewer records being preserved. Only for small datasets, low degrees of generalization and high values of the decrease of k did outweigh the decrease of β so that more records were preserved (see the "US Census" and "Crash statistics" datasets for = 2 and = 1.5). In all other cases the lower sampling probability dominated, especially for realistic values of ≤ 1.5. (c) Distribution of output quality We note that SafePub uses the highest possible value of β (see Section 3) for a given privacy budget (see Theorem 3). The results presented here justify this choice. They also indicate that values of anon in the order of one are a good choice. Unless noted otherwise, we will use an overall budget of = 1 in the following sections, which is a common setup [10, 46] and, as we will show, a good parameterization for our method as well.
Analysis of the Optimization Functions
We now investigate the effectiveness of the score functions and the quality of transformations selected by the exponential mechanism. We focus on Non-Uniform Entropy and Group Size, because the results obtained for the other score functions lied in between. We further focus on "US Census" and point out differences obtained using the larger datasets where applicable. Figure 12a shows the distribution of (normalized) scores within the solution space. We note that the y-axis represents the probability of selecting a transformation with a score value in a given range when drawing from the uniform distribution. For the other datasets, the fraction of transformations with higher scores increased with growing volume, because the more records are contained, the less records are likely to be suppressed because they appear less than k times. Figure 12b shows the probability mass functions used by the exponential mechanism when drawing a solution from the whole solution space using anon = 1 and various values of˜ between 10 −1 and 10 −4 . We focus on relatively small values since the search strategy executes the exponential mechanism several times so that higher budgets for each execution would add up to an unusably high overall budget. For˜ = 0.1 the resulting probability distributions were significantly better than the distributions obtained when drawing from the uniform distribution (see Figure 12a ). The improvements decreased with decreasing˜ and increased significantly with increasing data volumes. The main reason is that larger datasets often lead to broader ranges of score values in the solution space so that the application of the exponential function according to Definition 3 yields higher differences between probabilities for good and bad solutions. Figure 12c shows the results of 100 executions of the exponential mechanism. For each transformation selected, we calculated the difference to the optimal solution in terms of data quality using the model for which the score function has been designed. On average, we measured very good results of less than 4% for the Group Size model, even though solutions with a score in the range [30%, 50%[ were selected with the highest probability. This is because the according score function is not directly proportional to the quality model, but rather inversely proportional. Hence data quality increases significantly with increasing scores. The results for Non-Uniform Entropy were not as good with averages ranging from 31% (˜ = 10 −1 ) to 49% (˜ = 10 −4 ). The reason is that the according score function does not resemble the corresponding quality model as closely as the other score functions do. The results imply that a budget which is very small compared to the one required by the anonymization operator can suffice to achieve good results using the exponential mechanism.
Analysis of the Search Strategy
Next we analyze the influence of the number of steps performed by the search strategy on the quality of output data. We executed SafePub 10 times for each dataset and score function using varying numbers of steps. Since the previous results imply that a budget in the order of one is a good choice for the anonymization operator while a significantly smaller budget is sufficient for the exponential mechanism, we used an overall budget of = 1 which we have split into various combinations of search and anon . Figure 14 shows the results obtained for the "Health interviews" dataset, which are representative for the other datasets. The results for the Discernibility model were comparable to the results for the Granularity model. We normalized all values so that 0% corresponds to the input dataset and 100% to a dataset from which all information has been removed. All standard deviations were less than 12%. We note that increasing the number of steps performed by SafePub has two consequences: The number of executions of the exponential mechanism increases, while the budget˜ , which is used for each execution, decreases. It can be observed that the former effect tends to outweight the latter so that increasing the number of steps improves data quality. In all experiments the effect flattened at around 300 steps. Decreasing search from 1 to 10 −1 generally improved the results. Further reductions decreased data quality in some experiments and had no significant effects in the others. Hence, in the following sections, we will use a default parameterization of 300 steps, search = 0.1 and search = 0.9 unless noted otherwise. These values result in a budget of ≈ 10 −4 which did not perform as well as higher values when drawing from the whole solution space G m (see Section 8.3). However, since the search strategy draws repeatedly out of subsets of G m , it can still select very good solutions as we will see in the next section.
Analysis of the Quality of Output
Here we analyze output data quality for the default parameterization and compare it with the quality obtained using various baseline methods: The optimal quality obtained with k-anonymization, by only using random sampling and by random sampling combined with k-anonymization. We also measured the quality of the theoretical optimum which can be obtained with SafePub by deterministically selecting the optimal generalization scheme rather than using the search strategy. Each of these methods constitutes a baseline in terms of output quality for (combinations of) transformations performed by SafePub, and hence illustrates their impact on output data quality. We note that none of them satisfies differential privacy but that all approaches have been implemented such that the optimal transformation according to a given quality model is selected. To establish a strict baseline we set k = 5, which is common in the literature [12, 13] but less conservative than other values, e.g. k = 11 which has been recommended by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) [14] .
The results are shown in Figure 13 . Numbers for the Group Size model are not included as we measured values of less than 2% for all approaches. It can be seen that SafePub removed a significant amount of information from the datasets, i.e. between 83% and 71% according to the Non-Uniform Entropy model and between 41% and 43% according to the Discernibility model. It can further be observed that random sampling contributed the most to these reductions (41%). The average difference between results of SafePub and the theoretical optimum was very small (less than 3%). We note that, even though SafePub produced near-optimal results, the fraction of the solution space which has been traversed by the search strategy was relatively small. When using the "Crash statistics" dataset, this fraction was about 5%. In the other cases, it was about 10%. This confirms that the search strategy performs very well using the default parameters. In particular, it also achieves very good results for the Non-Uniform Entropy model, for which the exponential mechanism alone did not perform as well as for the other models (see Section 8.3).
Analysis of the Utility of Output
As there is not necessarily a strong correlation between loss of information and the actual usefulness of data, we now evaluate the performance of statistical classifiers built with the output of SafePub. This is the most common benchmarking workload for methods of privacy-preserving data publishing. We have used the class attributes listed in Table 2 , which resulted in both binomial and multinomial classification problems. For each dataset and class attribute, we executed 100 runs of SafePub with varying numbers of steps, varying values of anon and search = 0.1. We focused on anon , since the previous results showed that small values of search are sufficient and that anon thus primarily determines the overall trade-off between privacy and utility provided by SafePub. We configured SafePub to use the score function which optimizes output data for training statistical classifiers (see Section 5.5). All attributes besides the class attribute were used as features, and we used generalization schemes which do not generalize the class attribute.
As a classification method we used decision trees generated with the well-known C4.5 algorithm [49] because this is the most frequently used method in our context. We point out that it is obviously possible to use other classification methods with our approach and that we have obtained comparable results using logistic regression classifiers [54] . We created the classifiers from output data and evaluated their prediction accuracy with input data using the approach presented in [16] and 10-fold cross-validation. We report relative prediction accuracies, which means that all values have been normalized so that 0% represents the accuracy of the trivial ZeroR method, which always returns the most frequent value of the class attribute, while 100% corresponds to the accuracy of C4.5 decision trees trained on input data. Figure 15 shows the results of varying anon using 300 steps. As can be seen, the impact of anon was relatively small considering the strong effect on the number of preserved records (see Section 8.2). As expected, small values of anon often resulted in sub-optimal accuracies. Values of about anon = 0.9 generally resulted in good performance. Further increasing the parameter decreased the accuracies obtained. The reason is that, although increasing anon increases the number of preserved records, k also increases, which eventually causes a high degree of generalization.
5-anonymization.
In each experiment with 5-anonymization, we have selected the optimal scheme in the solution space. Table 2 lists the arithmetic means and standard deviations we have measured on output data of the exhaustive method with the information loss model to which each score function has been tailored. We report the relative information loss, which means that all values have been normalized so that 0% is the lowest and 100% is the highest loss of information induced by any full-domain generalization scheme.
As expected, the relative information loss and the standard deviations tend to improve with growing dataset size. In the case of Precision and Loss, the relative information loss is monotonically decreasing from rather good values of 31.4% and 25.2% for Census to very good values of 0.0% and 0.3% for IHIS. The results obtained for AECS stick out since already for Census, a very good information loss of less than 1% has been achieved. This might seem surprising considering that according to Figure 5 , generalization schemes in the comparatively low score range of [40%, 50%[ are being selected with the highest probability. We explain this by the fact that in the case of AECS, the information loss model is not directly proportional to the score function (which is the case e.g. for Loss), but rather inversely proportional. Hence, already for solutions with comparatively low scores, very good information loss values are being achieved. In the case of Non-Uniform Entropy, the results for ATUS and IHIS are good, but not as good as the results obtained for the other models. However, considering that the Non-Uniform Entropy score function does not resemble the corresponding information loss model as closely as the other score functions do, this is not too surprising.
In the following, we will compare the results we have obtained using the exhaustive and the greedy method. Increasing the number of steps performed by the greedy method has two consequences: On one hand, the number of applications of the exponential mechanism increases. On the other hand, the parameter which is used for each execution of the exponential mechanism decreases. We observed that the former effect tends to outweight the latter, so that increasing the number of steps tends to improve data quality. These improvements were particularly strong for smaller step values while step values greater than 300 did not lead to significant improvements anymore. Figure 7 exemplary shows the arithmetic means and standard deviations we have obtained for the AECS and the Non-Uniform Entropy model using step values ranging from 0 to 300. As can be seen, the greedy method can lead to results which are even better than those of the exhaustive method for small datasets (e.g. Census). The average difference between the values obtained using the greedy method with 300 steps and the exhaustive method was less than 1.4% (resp. 6.9% when considering only the cases in which the exhaustive method performed better). We conclude that the greedy method can perform comparable to the exhaustive method when using 300 steps. The average standard deviation obtained in all experiments using the greedy method was merely about 4.3% which shows that the degree of information loss in- tion has been removed. The values for the AECS model are not included. They were very good, with values of less than 2% achieved by DPLA using the US Census dataset, and almost 0% in all other experiments. As the figure shows, a large amount of information has often been removed by DPLA (e.g. 85% when using the US Census dataset, the exhaustive method, and the Non-Uniform Entropy model), with a significant amount of information being removed by the random sampling step (e.g. about 41% in case of the US Census dataset and the Non-Uniform Entropy model). As expected, the results we have achieved using our baseline methods are better. However, the privacy guarantees provided are significantly weaker, and also sampling with 5-anonymization significantly influences the distribution of attribute values. The differences between the results obtained using this method and the results for the exhaustive method ranged from 19% in the case of US Census and the Loss model to almost 0% when using Health interviews and the Discernibility model.
Data Utility for Statistical Classification
As we have seen, a significant amount of information is removed when using DPLA with realistic privacy parameters. However, this loss of information happens in a controlled manner, and the usefulness of data for the intended applications does not necessarily correlate with the absolute amount of information content; it rather depends on whether the data reflects characteristics of the input dataset which are relevant for the intended analyses or not. In the following, we investigate the utility of data resulting from DPLA for stastistical classification. In every experiment, we employed the Classification score function which is tailored to this use case. In Section 7.4.1, we analyze results obtained using both the greedy and exhaustive method. In Section 7.4.2, we compare DPLA with state-of-the-art mechanisms for differentially private statistical classification. Figure 16 shows results obtained for varying numbers of steps and anon = 0.9. As can be seen, the performance of the classifiers improved with an increasing number of steps. The average accuracies obtained using 300 steps ranged from 82% when predicting the second class attribute of "US Census" to about 99% when predicting the class attributes of "Crash statistics". Results were rather stable (standard deviations of about 5%).
5-anonymization.
In each experiment with 5-anonymization, we have selected the optimal scheme in the solution space. Table 2 lists the arithmetic means and standard deviations we have measured on output data of the exhaustive method with the information loss model to which each score function has been tailored. We report the relative information loss, which means that all values have been normalized so that 0% is the lowest and 100% is the highest loss of information induced by any full-domain generalization scheme. As expected, the relative information loss and the standard deviations tend to improve with growing dataset size. In the case of Precision and Loss, the relative information loss is monotonically decreasing from rather good values of 31.4% and 25.2% for Census to very good values of 0.0% and 0.3% for IHIS. The results obtained for AECS stick out since already for Census, a very good information loss of less than 1% has been achieved. This might seem surprising considering that according to Figure 5 , generalization schemes in the comparatively low score range of [40%, 50%[ are being selected with the highest probability. We explain this by the fact that in the case of AECS, the information loss model is not directly proportional to the score function (which is the case e.g. for Loss), but rather inversely proportional. Hence, already for solutions with comparatively low scores, very good information loss values are being achieved. In the case of Non-Uniform Entropy, the results for ATUS and IHIS are good, but not as good as the results obtained for the other models. However, considering that the Non-Uniform Entropy score function does not resemble the corresponding information loss model as closely as the other score functions do, this is not too surprising. tion has been removed. The values for the AECS model are not included. They were very good, with values of less than 2% achieved by DPLA using the US Census dataset, and almost 0% in all other experiments. As the figure shows, a large amount of information has often been removed by DPLA (e.g. 85% when using the US Census dataset, the exhaustive method, and the Non-Uniform Entropy model), with a significant amount of information being removed by the random sampling step (e.g. about 41% in case of the US Census dataset and the Non-Uniform Entropy model).
As expected, the results we have achieved using our baseline methods are better. However, the privacy guarantees Using the same setup, we also evaluated classification accuracies obtained using the output of the baseline methods discussed in Section 8.5 (sampling only, k-anonymization only), also optimized for building classifiers. All accuracies achieved were at least 97%.
In summary, these experiments justify our default parameterization, and we conclude that the differences between the performance of classifiers trained with unmodified input or the output of baseline methods and classifiers trained with the output of SafePub are small. This indicates that although SafePub removes a significant amount of information, it does so in a controlled manner which preserves frequent patterns hidden in the data.
Comparison With Prior Work
In this section we will put our method into perspective by experimentally comparing it to related approaches. We have performed all experiments using the default configuration (300 steps, = 1) and we have calculated δ as described in Section 7. Where applicable, we used the same hierarchies as in the previous experiments.
Comparison With Other Approaches for Differentially Private Statistical Classification
We compared SafePub to the following state-of-the-art algorithms: DiffGen [46] , DiffP-C4.5 [19] , LDA [55] , SDQ [57] and DPNB [29] . We have exactly replicated the setups reported in the respective publications and refer to them for exact specifications. All evaluations used (variants of) the "US Census" dataset (see Section 8.1) and the "Nursery" dataset [42] . We point out that the other methods implement -differential privacy while SafePub satisfies the slight relaxation ( , δ)-differential privacy, which potentially allows for higher data quality. However, unlike the other methods which output classifiers or synthetic microdata, SafePub outputs truthful microdata using a less flexible but truthful transformation technique. The results for all mechanisms except DiffGen, which we will address below, are listed in Table 3 . As can be seen, the accuracies obtained using C4.5 and SafePub were comparable to the results of DiffP-C4.5, LDA and DPNB for the "US Census" dataset. For the "Nursery" dataset, SafePub outperformed SDQ, while DPNB outperformed SafePub by 6.3%. In all experiments, we measured standard deviations of < 2%.
DiffGen is particularly closely related to SafePub because it also produces microdata using concepts from data anonymization (i.e. attribute transformation based on generalization hierarchies). Hence we have performed a more detailed analytical and experimental comparison. DiffGen employs a more flexible transformation model, subtree generalization, where values of an attribute can be transformed to different generalization levels (see Section 2.3). Analogously to SafePub, it also selects a transformation based on a user-specified number of iterative applications of the exponential mechanism (steps). However, in contrast to our approach, it does not achieve differential privacy by random sampling and k-anonymization, but rather by probabilistically generating synthetic records.
Using the implementation provided by the authors and our evaluation datasets we compared SafePub and DiffGen using C4.5 decision trees which were evaluated using 2/3 of the records as training data and the remaining 1/3 as test data (as proposed by the authors of DiffGen [46] ). We used a privacy budget of = 1 for both methods and increasing numbers of steps. The number of steps DiffGen can perform has a limit which depends on the heights of the generalization hierarchies and which was around 20 in our setup. For SafePub, we used between 0 and 300 steps since higher values did not improve the quality of results (see Section 8.4) . We performed every experiment 20 times. Table 4 lists average execution times and standard deviations for the maximal number of steps measured on the hardware described in Section 7.2. Moreover, we included the optimal accuracies obtained using any number of steps. SafePub outperformed DiffGen regarding maximal accuracies in seven out of eight experiments. The accuracies obtained by SafePub when predicting the second class attribute of "Health interviews" were 35% higher than the results obtained by DiffGen. The minimal and maximal execution times of SafePub varied from between 4s and 7s ("US Census") to between 90s and 128s ("Health interviews"). The corresponding times of Diff-Gen varied from between 15s and 18s to between 62s and 70s. In summary, SafePub was faster than DiffGen for smaller datasets while DiffGen was faster than SafePub for larger datasets.
A more detailed analysis is provided in Figure 17 , which shows execution times and relative accuracies obtained using different numbers of steps. It can be seen that the accuracies achieved by SafePub improved monotonically over time (apart from minor fluctuations which are a result of randomization) while no such relationship can be observed for DiffGen. We explain this by the fact that SafePub is not likely to be trapped in a local minimum (see Section 6) while DiffGen can only keep on specializing a transformation once it has been selected. This implies that SafePub is easier to parameterize and enables trading execution times off against data quality.
Comparison With the Approach by Fouad et al.
We conclude our experimental evaluation by presenting a comparison with the approach which is most closely related to ours. Fouad et al. have also proposed a truthful ( , δ)-differentially private microdata release mechanism using random sampling and generalization [18, 43] .
Their algorithm replaces each record independently with a generalized record which is t-frequent, i.e. a generalization of at least t records from the input dataset. The authors show that the mechanism satisfies ( , δ)dif-ferential privacy, however, with unknown δ. They further show that an upper bound for δ can be calculated when t is chosen greater than a threshold T [43, Theorem 4] . Knowing δ is, however, crucial for guaranteeing a known degree of privacy.
We analyzed T and the resulting values of δ for various common input parameters. We emphasize that we chose all parameters in such a way that T is as small as possible. Figure 18 shows the results for = 1.
As can be seen, δ decreases very quickly for an increasing number of attributes, while T increases exponentially. For datasets with three attributes, T equals 76, while for datasets with seven attributes, T equals 1, 217 al-ready. Hence, a very high degree of generalization is required to obtain known privacy guarantees. We experimentally evaluated the method choosing = 1 and t = T + 1 so that the approach satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy. We performed the experiments ten times and report average results (standard deviations < 1%). All information was removed from all datasets but "Health interviews" for which some information was preserved. However, 68% of records were removed and seven out of eight attributes were completely suppressed. With the models considered in this article, we measured reductions in data quality of between 97% and 99%, which renders the approach impractical.
Related Work
Other works have also investigated relationships between syntactic privacy models and differential privacy. Domingo-Ferrer and Soria-Comas have shown that there is a theoretical relationship between -differential privacy and a stochastic extension of t-closeness and that satisfying t-closeness can imply -differential privacy under certain assumptions [8] . Moreover, Soria-Comas et al. and Jafer et al. have also combined k-anonymity and differential privacy [27, 30] . While our approach uses k-anonymity in order to create a differentially private mechanism, these works employ k-anonymization to reduce the amount of noise that must be added.
Moreover, further differential privacy mechanisms have been proposed that use random sampling. Fan and Jin [17] as well as Jorgensen et al. [32] have used non-uniform random sampling to produce aggregate data. Hong et al. have used random sampling for protecting search logs [24] . These are all special-purpose mechanisms while SafePub is a generic microdata release algorithm.
For further differentially private microdata release methods see the surveys [6, 38] . Unlike SafePub, most of them are not truthful or use methods that are very different from those typically used in data anonymization. We have compared our approach to the notable exception, i.e. the approach by Fouad et al. [18, 43] , in Section 8.7.2 and found that it is not practical.
Differentially private machine learning is also an ongoing field of research (see the surveys [31, 51] ). We have compared our approach to five different state-of-the-art methods in Section 8.7.1. We have performed a detailed experimental comparison with DiffGen [46] because of its conceptual similarities to our approach. Our results showed that our method, which is the only generic and truthful approach in the field, achieves accuracies that compare well to those of special-purpose mechanisms.
Gehrke et al. have also studied the approach by Li et al. [26] , albeit from a purely theoretical perspective. They showed that it satisfies a privacy model called crowd-blending privacy. Informally, this model guarantees that every record r from the input dataset either blends into a "crowd" of at least k records or that r is essentially being ignored by the mechanism. Their work also indicates that the mechanism satisfies a relaxation of another model called zero-knowledge privacy [22] .
Summary and Discussion
In this paper we have presented a flexible differentially private data release mechanism that produces truthful output data, which is important in some data publishing scenarios [3] and domains such as medicine [6] . While it has been argued that differential privacy is difficult to explain to non-experts the approach offers an intuitive notion of privacy protection: with a probability determined by the data of an individual will not be included at all and even if it is included it will only be released in a generalized form such that it cannot be distinguished from the similarly generalized data of at least k−1 other individuals, where k is determined by and δ.
Our evaluation showed that the method is practical and that values in the order of = 1 are a good parameterization. The current implementation uses full-domain generalization and the k-anonymity privacy model, methods which have frequently been criticized for being too inflexible and too strict to produce output data of high quality [2] . However, our experiments have shown that statistical classifiers trained with the output of the generic method parameterized with an appropriate objective function perform as well as non-truthful differential privacy mechanism designed specifically for this use case. The reason is that while the approach indeed removes a significant amount of information it does so in a controlled manner which extracts frequent patterns. Compared to prior work, however, our approach provides slightly lower privacy guarantees.
While developing the score functions introduced in Section 5, we learned that optimization functions which have the form of sums to which every record or cell contributes a non-negative summand tend to have a low sensitivity. According score functions can often be obtained easily (see score functions for Data Granularity, Intensity and Classification). If the sensitivity is high, it can be possible to reduce it by division through the size of the dataset or by forming reciprocals (see score functions for Discernibility and Group Size). If this is not the case, it can be worthwhile to try to find functions with lower sensitivities which have related properties (see score function for Non-Uniform Entropy).
Future Work
An interesting line of future research is to develop score functions tailored to further quality models which address learning tasks such as regression or time-to-event analysis [54] . Based on our experiences presented in the previous section we are confident that, for example, the workload-aware quality models presented by LeFevre et al. in [37] can be integrated into the method.
Another potential direction for further work is to try to consider the effects of random sampling which may have been performed during data acquisition to reduce the amount of explicit random sampling that needs to be used by the mechanism.
In its current form SafePub is suited for protecting dense data of low to medium dimensionality as high-dimensional data is often sparse and hence cannot be k-anonymized while retaining sufficient data quality. We plan to investigate methods for vertically partitioning high-dimensional data, such that disassociated subsets of correlated attributes can be processed independently. Moreover, future work could investigate the crowd-blending and the zero-knowledge privacy models which provide other means of formalizing the notion of "hiding in a group" than our implementation. We point out that these models can also make it possible to prefer certain records, e.g. for publishing control or test data using random sampling which is slightly biased [26] .
Finally, a variety of unified frameworks have been proposed for comparing the trade-off between privacy and utility provided by algorithms which implement privacy models, including syntactic ones and -differential privacy [4, 20, 41] . As the mechanism presented here is the first practical implementation of differential privacy for the release of truthful microdata, it would be interesting to compare it to other methods using such frameworks.
B Proofs of Sensitivities
B.1 Granularity (Theorem 6)
Proof. Let k ∈ N be an arbitrary integer, let g ∈ G m be an arbitrary generalization scheme and let D 1 , D 2 ∈ D m be arbitrary datasets satisfying |D 1 ⊕ D 2 | = 1. Without loss of generality we assume D 1 = D 2 ∪ {r}. We will use the notation g(r) = (r 1 , ...,r m ) and point out that ∀i = 1, ..., m : 0 ≤ leavesi(ri) |Ωi| ≤ leavesi( * ) |Ωi| = 1 holds.
-If g(r) = * holds or g(r) = * appears less than k times in g(D 1 ), then g(r) is suppressed in both S(D 1 ) and S(D 2 ) with S(D 1 ) = S(D 2 ) ∪ { * }. We can conclude: We can conclude:
-If g(r) = * appears more than k times in g(D 1 ), then g(r) is not suppressed in both S(D 1 ) and S(D 2 ) with S(D 1 ) = S(D 2 ) ∪ {g(r)}. We can conclude:
In summary we have:
B.2 Discernibility (Theorem 7)
In the following we will frequently employ the triangle inequality and indicate its application with (T). In order to prove the sensitivity of the Discernibility score function we will first propose two lemmas:
Proof. If D 2 = ∅ holds we have D 1 = {r } and can conclude:
|φ(D 1 ) − φ(D 2 )| = |1 − 0| = 1.
In the following we will assume D 2 = ∅ and define c := |D 1 |, n := |{r ∈ D 1 }|, y := |{ * ∈ D 1 }| and -If r = * holds we have |{r ∈ D 2 }| = n − 1 and |{ * ∈ D 2 }| = y. Moreover, x + n 2 = E∈EQ(D1) |E| 2 = r∈D1:r = * |{r ∈ D 1 }| ≤ r∈D1 |D 1 | = c 2 holds. We can conclude:
-If r = * holds we have |{ * ∈ D 2 }| = y − 1 and we can conclude using x = E∈EQ(D1) |E| 2 = r∈D1:r = * |{r ∈ D 1 }| ≤ r∈D1\{ * } |D 1 | ≤ c(c − 1):
In summary we have |φ(D 1 ) − φ(D 2 )| ≤ 5. 
